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Abstract 
 This Article analyzes the evolution of Antitrust Law (known as 
Competition Law in Europe) in United States of America.  It is important to 
study the history of Antitrust Law in USA, because the roots and the origin 
of this important law and regulation that guarantee the economic rights and 
freedoms of persons and companies has started in USA, inherited from the 
Common Law system. 
This Article is composed by 4 main components, such as: Introduction of 
Antitrust Law, History of Sherman Act, History of Clayton Act and The 
enforcement of Competition Law in USA. A greater attention is given to the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. 
To better understand the Sherman Act, it is described the history path of the 
legalization of the act,  reason why this act was implemented in USA, which 
were some challenges of the system at that time, how it is enforced, etc.?  
The same analogy is done with the Clayton Act and other amendments of 
Antitrust Acts. 
At the end of the paper it is introduced the main tools that helps to function 
the Antitrust law in USA, by analyzing the role of Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission and Exemptions and 
Immunities. 
 
Keywords: Antitrust in USA, Sherman act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade 
Commission 
 
Introduction of Antitrust Law 
 Antitrust emerged in the late nineteenth century as a response to the 
growth of the trusts and their power in the American economy. In that 
period, the prevailing ideology of government’s role in the economy was 
laissez faire, but it had recently been attacked by a variety of progressive 
social movements that advocated greater governmental intervention (Sidney 
Fine, 1956).  The trusts and other social injustices, however, gave 
ammunition to reformers who sought to intervene in the market, often to 
redistribute wealth or limit private power in the interests of fairness.  
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 Since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust law has 
always revolved around the core economic concepts of competition and 
market power. For over a century, it has been illegal in the United States for 
competitors to enter into price-fixing cartels and related schemes and for a 
monopolist to use its market power to stifle competition (Louis Kaplow, Carl 
Shapiro, 2007, pg.3). The Sherman Act did, however, create affirmative civil 
and criminal sanctions for antitrust violations, a radical step beyond the 
common law’s passive refusals to enforce disfavored combinations and 
conspiracies.61 The creation of positive remedies recognized the possibility 
not only of market imperfections, such as persistent private cartels and 
monopolies, but of effective, temporary governmental intervention to restore 
the market. Under a pure evolutionary vision, the self-correcting mechanisms 
of the market would break down private cartels and monopolies, except 
when government privileges protected them (Hans B. Thorelli, 1955, 164-
225). 
 The Sherman Act, by prohibiting monopolization, but not monopoly, 
indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract 
is the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly. Sherman Act 
Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1; Sherman Act Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and Clayton 
Act Section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18, contains: the prohibit agreements in restraint 
of trade, the monopolization and attempts and conspiracies to monopolize, 
and the last mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen 
competition. With a few exceptions, that is all the statutory law one needs to 
know (Stephen Calkins, 2007).  
 Before we further with the evolution of competition law, it is 
necessary to introduce some relevant concepts that are the core elements in 
analyzing Antitrust, such as: Economic profit; Perfect competition; Market 
Power and Monopoly. 
 Economic profit is the excess of revenue over costs, where costs 
include compensation for risk taking and the opportunity cost of capital. This 
is not the same as accounting profit, which makes no attempt to include risk 
taking and lost opportunities as elements of total cost. A firm may be earning 
positive accounting profits and negative economic profits. This is why one 
cannot infer monopoly power simply from observing the profit report of a 
company (Keith N. Hylton, 2003, pg 9). 
 The fundamental results of the model of perfect competition is the 
following: In long run competitive equilibrium, firms earn zero economic 
profits. This happens because of the entry and exit. If Firms earn positive 
economic profits, then rivals will enter the market. Entry continues until the 
increase in supply pushes price down to a level that just compensates for the 
                                                          
61 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). 
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cost of producing and the opportunity cost of capital and managerial skills. If 
firms earn negative economic profits, exit will occur until economics profits 
return to zero (Keith N. Hylton, 2003,  pg 10). 
 The concept of market power is fundamental to antitrust economics 
and to the law. The notion of market power is frequently used as a screen: a 
firm (or group of firms) must be shown to have some level of market power 
as a prerequisite to considering whether the conduct in question gives rise to 
antitrust liability. As a result, antitrust investigations and adjudications 
devote substantial attention to whether or not the requisite market power 
exists. In rhetoric and often in reality, this legal approach of viewing market 
power as something either present or absent—a dichotomous classification—
is at odds with the technical economic notion of market power as a matter of 
degree. This feature of antitrust law’s use of a market power requirement is 
well illustrated by the law of monopolization (Louis Kaplow, Carl Shapiro, 
2007). For a better understanding, a monopolist is a single supplier of a good. 
However, this definition is too simple, because it includes firms that become 
dominant by being the lowest-cost competitor and those that obtain an 
exclusive franchise from the state. The crucial feature of monopoly status is 
the absence of competition from other firms (Keith N. Hylton, 2003, pg 1). 
 Competition policy played a starring role in the 1912 presidential 
campaign, leading to the election of Woodrow Wilson and the enactment in 
1914 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq., and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. The Clayton Act provided for 
private enforcement of the antitrust laws and substantively addressed price 
discrimination (Section 2), tying and exclusive dealing (Section 3), mergers 
and acquisitions (Section 7), and interlocking directorates (Section 8). The 
most important of those provisions today are Section 7 (as amended in 1950 
by the Celler-Kefauver Act, through which Congress expressed concern 
about increasing concentration), and Section 2 (as amended in 1936 by the 
Robinson-Patman Act). The Federal Trade Commission Act created a new, 
independent agency and charged it with preventing “unfair methods of 
competition” and, thanks to a 1938 amendment, “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices” (Stephen Calkins, 2007, pg 5).  The Clayton act declared the 
following acts illegal, but not criminal; 1- price discrimination (section 2); 2- 
tying and exclusive dealing contracts (section 3); 3-corporate mergers that 
tend to result in monopoly (section 7) and 4- interlocking directorates that is 
common board members among competing companies (section 8), (Keith N. 
Hylton, 2003, pg 30). 
 The Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914 are 
easier to explain than the Sherman Act. They were both a response to the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Standards Oil Co. v. United States, that the 
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Sherman act condemned only unreasonable restrains of trade (Keith N. 
Hylton, 2003, pg 39). 
 In the mid-1970s, another evolutionary approach, the Chicago 
School, began to influence law and policy (William H. Page, 2008). 
Beginning in the 1950s, the Director of the University of Chicago Law 
School began to articulate a sweeping critique of antitrust law that eventually 
influenced the writings of numerous scholars associated with Chicago 
(Aaron Director, Edward H. Levi, 1956). The Chicago critique applied 
neoclassical economics, which in turn rested on the evolutionary vision of 
the market as a locus of value-maximizing exchange. The Chicago approach 
thus formalized many of the intuitions of the judges of the formative period, 
focusing the analysis on the effects of practices on output in the market 
rather than on trader freedom. The critique grew to encompass a shared set of 
models of practices such as tying arrangements, vertical integration, cartels, 
resale price maintenance, and predatory pricing. These models, when paired 
with the empirical assumptions of the evolutionary vision, tended to suggest 
that practices like vertical restraints and predatory pricing were rarely 
anticompetitive. Consequently, Chicago scholars recommended abolishing 
many per se rules and refocusing antitrust primarily on cartels (Ward S. 
Bowman, 1973).  
 Both Chicago scholars and their critics have attempted to describe the 
essence of the Chicago approach. Three features of the Chicago approach 
are: The development of the approach within an identifiable research 
tradition; the centrality of a set of accepted applications of theory to specific 
antitrust practices; and the importance of the relationship between positive 
analysis of economic behavior and normative recommendations for legal 
treatment of that behavior (William H. Page, 1989, pg 1229). 
 More important in defining the Chicago antirust paradigm are the 
specific analyses of antitrust practices. The approach has developed through 
the extension of the insights of those concrete applications to analogous 
antitrust issues (William H. Page, 1989, pg 1231). 
 The models adapt the assumption of maximizing behavior to the 
special circumstances of antitrust practices. They assume that firms engage 
in practices for gain, whether in the form of monopoly profits or increased 
productivity. The general theory indicates that firms may gain monopoly 
profits in two ways: by eliminating competition among themselves by 
agreement, or by excluding other competitors from the market (William H. 
Page, 1989, pg 1233). The Chicago models recognize, however that 
agreements among competitors may reduce costs (William H. Page, 1989, pg 
1235). 
 Although a post–Chicago School for antitrust has developed over the 
past decade, antitrust, “has to a great extent been normalized, domesticated.” 
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The federal agencies’ antitrust enforcement is still largely shaped by the 
Chicago School’s rational choice theories. These theories are applied to 
various conducts, such as vertical restraints, conduct by a monopolist, and 
tying. The Court’s view on monopolies, on the other hand, was much more 
forgiving. Indeed, monopolies and the charging of monopoly prices were 
surmised as “an important element of the free-market system”, (Maurice E. 
Stucke, 2007, Pg 30).         
 A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division cited this language in support of an enforcement 
hierarchy, consistent with the Chicago School’s antitrust theories: 
government enforcers would focus primarily on cartel behavior, followed by 
mergers, and lastly monopolies. This third priority’s focus was not in 
prosecuting monopolies, but rather in developing and promoting objective 
standards to judge monopoly behavior, so as not to chill pro-competitive 
behavior and prevent monopolists from reaping the rewards of their success. 
Some antitrust commentators have argued that section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act involving “unfair methods of competition” has been 
watered down to the economic consumer welfare standard endorsed by the 
Chicago School (Maurice E. Stucke, 2007, Pg 31 ).         
 
History of Sherman Act 
 The Sherman Act was fashioned of materials borrowed from the 
common law, the body of judicial decisions that the U.S. inherited from 
England. But the common law did not always defend freedom of trade & 
abhor monopoly. American common law contained precedents in which the 
framers of the Sherman Act could find a certain amount of hope. The 
Sherman Act was passed in response to public demand. The American 
public, schooled in a long tradition of opposing special privileges of every 
sort and in an old habit of calling all such privileges “monopoly”, began to 
protest sharply against the “trust”, that grow steadily more numerous after 
1885 (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 15). 
 The first extended public deliberations about enacting competition 
policy as positive law in America occurred around the Sherman Act debates 
between 1888 and 1890. 
 For two decades following passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
cases calling for interpretation of the statute divided the Supreme Court into 
warring factions (Rudolph Peritz, 1996, pg 9). 
 The interest in general regulation emerged at a time of growing 
tensions between rule and exception, between ideology and actuality. New 
economic conditions called into question the assumptions underlying 
classical political economy (Rudolph Peritz, 1996, pg 11). 
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 With much debate and shifting the Congress passed the Sherman Act 
as a tentative experimental effort to express such a policy with the use of 
common law categories (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 16). In dealing with the 
cases, judges saw many defects in the drafting of the Sherman Act. 
Dissatisfied with some effects of the Sherman Act and hoping to modify it 
they pressed for establishment of a regulatory system in which expert 
administration would replace the sporadic and unpredictable rulings of 
courts. (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 17). These desires, forwarded by the 
proclamation of the Rule of Reason and the powerful leadership of President 
Wilson, brought forth the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 17). 
 
Interpreting the Sherman Act at an early stage  
 On January 21, 1888, early in the first session of the fiftieth congress, 
congressman Henry Bacon (DNY) introduced a resolution to direct the 
House Committee on manufactures to investigate trust in several industries 
and to recommend suitable legislation. On July 30 the house committee on 
manufactures issued an interim report. Within two weeks, John Sherman 
(Ohio) and several other senators introduced antitrust bills. A month later 
committee chairman Sherman reported to the full senate his Antitrust bill, 
with the following operative language: “that all arrangements, contracts, 
agreements, trusts, or combinations…made with a view, or which tend to 
prevent full and free competition….or which tend to advance the cost to the 
consumer….are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and 
void”, (Rudolph Peritz, 1996, pg 13). 
 Later on the Judiciary Committee’s new bill replaced Senator 
Sherman’s 1888 language of “full and free competition” and “cost to the 
consumers” with the common law language of contract….in restraint of 
trade” and “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize trade”. Senator Sherman 
began the debate about his bill to secure “full and fair competition” with the 
familiar themes of industrial liberty and consumerism (Rudolph Peritz, 1996, 
pg 16). 
 The conflicting views of industrial liberty expressed in the debates 
can be understood in two ways. First, “liberty” was taken to mean both 
freedom from government power and freedom from market power. Can also 
be understood in a second way, one toward liberty and the other toward 
equality (Rudolph Peritz, 1996, pg 17). In short, freedom of contract 
protected “fair profit” or fair return”, an important social value threatened by 
the ravages of competition (Rudolph Peritz, 1996, pg 18). 
 The 1890 bill replaced the old language of “full and free 
competition” and “cost to the consumer” with the common law language of 
“restraint of trade” and “monopolization”. The new bill included civil and 
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criminal remedies lying for outside the common law’s contract framework 
(Rudolph Peritz, 1996, pg 20). 
 The first section of the act declared illegal: “every contract, 
combination… or conspiracy, in restraint of trade…..”. Congress had 
intended by this concise formula to outlaw three sorts of agreement, each 
having a proper common –law name:  contracts in restraint of trade, 
combinations in restraint of trade, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. The 
world “every” created doubts, for it could be taken to mean that the act went 
beyond the common law, which did not forbid “every” restraint of trade but 
only “unreasonable” restraints (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 144). 
 As the first effort to control the economy at large, the Sherman 
antitrust law posed special problems for judges. Antitrust cases required 
more thorough and delicate analysis of economic issues than had ever been 
needed in resolving questions under the older branches of law. The greatest 
difficulty is to determine the facts of a case as to discover the meaning of the 
state. However, it is surprising that the courts were able, in less than a 
decade, to formulate the fundamental rules of law that have since governed 
that statute’s application (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 143). 
 The Sherman act has often been blamed on the supposed vagueness 
of its language, which presumably gives judges too much leeway to intrude 
personal opinion into their interpretations. A judge ought not, we say, to 
change the law very much- though inevitably he changes it a little- when he 
interprets it (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 279). 
 Another proposed of making antitrust law more certain and 
predictable is to turn it over to a regulatory commission, thus by-passing the 
judges. They can diverge from strict standards of evidence and proof. Not 
being strictly bound by precedent they can make new rules as occasion calls 
for them. They can in short do everything, that the legislative, executive and 
judiciary can do and more (William Letwin, 1965, Pg 280). 
 
What led to the Sherman act 1890? 
 On July 2, 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act and in so doing 
created a baseline for the control of competition in the United States. To the 
modern eye, the Sherman Act is notable for its simultaneous brevity and 
comprehensiveness (Dennis W. Carlton, Randal C. Picker, 2006). One can 
take either a “public interest” or public choice” view of the enactment of the 
Sherman Act. The public interest view holds that congress was sincerely 
trying to do something to bring monopolies under control, to inject more 
competition into the economy, and to reassert the value of the individual 
consumer over that of the large conglomerate firm. The public choice view 
suggests that legislators used the Sherman act in an effort to keep themselves 
in office (Keith N. Hylton, 2003, pg 37). 
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 Several things came together in the late 1800s. many individuals, 
including legislators, considered the railroads and the trusts (Standard Oil, 
American Tabaco) too powerful. The transportation and communication 
revolutions of the middle 1800s led to large business, which created jobs but 
also destroyed many through business expansion. Congress received 
numerous petitions to put the trusts and the railroads under the regulation of 
the federal government (Keith N. Hylton, 2003, pg 38). 
 However, because the legislative process is influenced by special 
interests, it is worthwhile to at least consider alternative assessments of the 
motivations of Congress in 1890. The cynical view is that the Sherman Act 
was a harmless way of appeasing public demands for regulation, and at the 
same time allowing members of Congress to garner support for and deflect 
criticism regarding the protective tariff legislation (Keith N. Hylton, 2003, 
pg 38). 
 
What led to Clayton Antitrust Act 1914? 
 The Clayton Antitrust Act is an amendment passed by U.S. Congress 
in 1914 that provides further classification and substance to the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890 on topics such as price discrimination, price fixing and 
unfair business practices. 
 The Acts are enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 
 In 1914, Henry De Lamar Clayton of Alabama introduced the 
Clayton Antitrust Bill to regulate massive corporations. The bill passed the 
House of Representatives with a wide majority on June 5, 1914. President 
Woodrow Wilson Signed the initiative into law on October 15, 1914. 
 As of 2016, the Clayton Antitrust Act has 26 sections. The 2 section 
handles the unlawfulness of price discrimination, price cutting and predatory 
pricing. The 3 section addresses exclusive dealings or the attempt to create a 
monopoly. The 4 section takes the right of private lawsuits of any individual 
injured by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws 
(www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clayton-antitrust-act.asp). The 6 section 
handles labor and exemption of the workforce. The 7 section handles 
mergers and acquisitions and is often referred to when multiple companies 
attempt to become one entity. 
 The Sherman Antitrust Act was the first Act to prohibit trusts and 
outlaw monopolistic business practices. However the vague language of the 
bill allowed business to continue engaging in operations that discouraged 
competition and fair pricing. While the Sherman Antitrust act made 
monopolies illegal, the Clayton Antitrust Act banned operations conducive to 
the formation of monopolies.  
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 The Clayton Antitrust Act was later amended by the Robinson 
Patman Act of 1936 and the Celler Kefauver Act of 1950. The Robinson 
Patman Act reinforced laws against price discrimination among customers. 
The Celler Kefauver Act prohibited the transfer of assets or equity if an 
acquisition reduced competition (www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clayton-
antitrust-act.asp). 
 
Enforcement of Competition Law  
 With the 1914 legislation, the key institutional features that still 
dominate U.S. antitrust law were established: the Sherman Act, the Clayton 
Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The balance between antitrust 
and regulation still had to be worked out (Dennis W. Carlton, Randal C. 
Picker, 2006, pg 22). U.S. antitrust lawyers, usually worry about only three 
statutory provisions: Sherman Act Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1; Sherman Act 
Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and Clayton Act Section 7, 15 U.S.C. § The first 
prohibits agreements in restraint of trade, the second monopolization and 
attempts and conspiracies to monopolize, and the last mergers and 
acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. These few important 
statutory provisions are easy to note but answer few questions (Stephen 
Calkins, 2007) 
 Firms engaging in an anticompetitive practice could find themselves 
sued by one or more of the Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), any of 51 state attorneys general (counting the District 
of Columbia), or lawyers representing individual or classes of customers, 
competitors, suppliers, or possibly other injured private parties. 
Consequences could include criminal penalties (including incarceration and 
massive fines), injunctions, treble damages, and, in rare cases, disgorgement 
or consumer redress (Stephen Calkins, 2007, pg 7). 
  
Department of Justice Antitrust Division  
 The Antitrust Division is headed by an Assistant Attorney General 
(AAG) nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The AAG 
is frequently someone appointed directly or indirectly from the private sector 
who serves typically for two or three years. The AAG is supported by several 
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, two Directors of Enforcement (one for 
criminal enforcement, one for economics), and a Director of Operations. The 
work of the Division is done in a dozen “sections,” each headed by a Chief. 
The crown jewel of the Division’s work is its cartel program. This is 
extremely serious prosecutions because price fixing and related offenses 
such as bid rigging are felonies, and full Constitutional protections apply. 
Criminal enforcement tools, such as search warrants and electronic 
surveillance, are regularly used. Grand juries collect evidence and vote 
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indictments, and conviction can result in draconian penalties. Those penalties 
have increased steadily over time and are supplemented by penalties for 
obstruction of justice, perjury, and mail and wire fraud.  Since May 1999, 
more than 100 individuals (at least 20 of them foreign nationals) have been 
sent to jail. Since fiscal 1997, more than $3 billion in criminal fines have 
been imposed—and the 2004 increase in fines has only just taken effect 
(Stephen Calkins, 2007, pg 8). 
 
The Federal Trade Commission  
 In 1914, Congress, dissatisfied with the course of competition 
enforcement during the first two decades, supplemented the Justice 
Department’s role by creating the Federal Trade Commission. The vision for 
the FTC was as a guide to business, pointing the way toward fair methods of 
competition. From the start it was a collective body, with five commissioners 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Whereas the 
Justice Department could invoke the power of criminal penalties, the 
Commission was limited to ordering firms to cease engaging in what were 
found to be “unfair methods of competition”—without any penalty being 
imposed (Stephen Calkins, 2007, pg 9). 
 Commissions typically are small and are controlled by the party of 
the President; the President also chooses the chair of the commission. 
Turnover of the presidency means turnover of the Commission. In contrast, 
the federal courts are quite stable over time, but are subject to very little 
control at any point in time. But the sheer number of judges means that two 
contemporaneous decisions may reach quite different outcomes (Dennis W. 
Carlton, Randal C. Picker, 2006). The classic FTC case involves 
administrative adjudication. The Commission has broad powers to order pre-
complaint investigations. When a majority of the Commission has “reason to 
believe” that a firm (called a “respondent”) is engaging in an “unfair method 
of competition,” the Commission issues a complaint. There after a trial is 
held before an Administrative Law Judge, who issues an opinion that is 
inevitably appealed (by one side or the other, or both) to the full 
Commission. The Commission typically hears oral argument and issues an 
opinion and final order. If it is adverse to the respondent, the respondent may 
appeal to its choice of almost any court of appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). 
Although that is the classic procedure, it little accords with modern practice. 
Most FTC competition law cases are settled by consent orders. A majority of 
the FTC’s competition cases involve mergers and acquisitions (Stephen 
Calkins, 2007, pg 10).  
 When many parts in the economic system need to move at the same 
time, it may be very hard for lower federal courts to coordinate decision-
making, and Supreme Court decisions are rare and slow to come. The 
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inefficiency in a network industry of having uncoordinated decision-making 
could be very high. Courts are passive when it comes to agenda setting: they 
can only decide the cases that come before them. In contrast, agencies 
expressly control their own agendas, subject to the original statute to be sure, 
but tied down often by nothing more than a public interest standard. The 
ability to set agendas means that agencies can push forward on all parts of 
the economic system at the same time. 
 Agencies can do punctuated equilibrium: leaps from one spot to 
another, while courts are normally limited to smaller moves within 
established frameworks. Our logic predicts that as policy concerns with 
competition arise in particular industries, all else being equal, network 
industries are more likely than non-network industries to see their 
competition regulated by agencies, rather than the courts (Dennis W. 
Carlton, Randal C. Picker, 2006, pg 9). 
 
Exemptions and Immunities  
 Unfortunately, there is a very long list of exemptions and immunities 
from the U.S. antitrust laws. Some provide complete immunity; some partial 
(for instance, reduction of damages from treble to single); some theoretically 
none, except to the extent that entrusting enforcement to a regulatory body 
rather than the antitrust agencies inevitably reduces the primacy of 
competition values. Some are statutory, some judge-made. Other than with 
respect to the difficulty of eliminating exemptions, generalizations are 
challenging. Statutory exemptions include ones for agricultural cooperatives, 
insurance, labor, sports broadcasting, and various forms of communication, 
energy, and transportation. The most important court-made exemptions are 
those for petitioning government (known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine), 
and for government action itself and the results thereof (known as the state 
action doctrine). Both doctrines are complicated and controversial, are 
frequent subjects of litigation (including at the Supreme Court), and 
regularly receive special attention from the antitrust agencies (Stephen 
Calkins, 2007, pg 36). 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper tries to inform the young researchers and the law students 
about the evolution of competition law in USA. It is very important to start 
from the Common Law legislation and the path of Antitrust Law in USA 
because these are the roots of the Competition Law that has inspired the 
modern legislation all over the world, especially in Europe.  
 This research starts with Sherman Act that was passed in Congress in 
1980, the first challenges, additional changes and how this act can be 
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improved from what was missing. The next action was the Clayton Act that 
was passed in 1914 as a better version of the Antitrust Law. 
 The Clayton Antitrust Act was later amended by the Robinson 
Patman Act of 1936 and the Celler Kefauver Act of 1950. The Robinson 
Patman Act reinforced laws against price discrimination among customers. 
The Celler Kefauver Act prohibited the transfer of assets or equity if an 
acquisition reduced competition (www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clayton-
antitrust-act.asp). 
 In this paper is also discussed the enforcement of the Antitrust Law 
and the main bodies, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and The 
Federal Trade Commission. 
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